Safeguards Agreement Dprk
KEDO Nuclear Plant Project. Factors relevant to the DPRK`s position are its relationship with the United States and the progress made under the KEDO project. The conclusion of an internal review conducted by the United States in June 2001 was that the implementation of the agreed framework should be improved. The agreed framework was to complete the first reactor in 2003, but the project was delayed for a number of reasons. However, since the start of the construction phase in February 2000, the project has been on schedule. Concrete from the first reactor was poured on August 7, 2002. In accordance with the delivery protocol of the 1995 KEDO-DPRK supply agreement, delivered to the DPRK at the end of April 2002 (and brought to the Agency`s attention), the first key nuclear components will be delivered in mid-2005. This is important for the Agency, as the agreed framework provides that the DPRK must fully comply with its guarantee agreement before significant nuclear elements can be delivered. In essence, the IAEA`s mandate is to implement safeguard measures in accordance with its status and relevant safeguard agreements or, where appropriate, UN Security Council resolutions. The IAEA`s statute authorizes the Agency “… At the request of the parties, as a result of any bilateral or multilateral agreement. 2IAEO, IAEA Statute, Article III.A.5, December 28, 1989.
If the parties to an agreement ask the IAEA to implement safeguard measures, the scope of the safeguards and procedures followed depends on the requirements of the agreement. Second, all IAEA standard protection agreements give inspectors the right to access sites outside declared nuclear facilities to resolve issues or investigate possible violations. Comprehensive security agreements provide for special inspections allowing inspectors to conduct investigations at any location when information provided by the state… insufficient for the Agency to assume its responsibilities under the relevant agreement.” 8IAEA, INFCIRC/153, paragraph. 73. The INFCIRC/66 agreements also provide for special inspections. 9IAEA, The Agency`s Safeguards System (1965), INFCIRC/66, paragraph. December 53, 1965, www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1965/infcirc66.pdf. Under the additional protocol, inspectors have the right to have additional access to it where necessary to resolve questions or inconsistencies regarding the information available to the Agency.
10IAEA, Model Protocol In addition to agreements between states and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards, INFCIRC/540, art. 4 A.a.iii, September 1997, www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc540.pdf. As agreed, North Korea has committed to freeze operations at major facilities at the Yongbyon site – the 5 MWe reactor, the radiochemical laboratory (reprocessing plant), the fuel plant and the partially constructed 50 MWe plant. The freezing point also applied to the 200 MWe reactor under construction in Taechon. IAEA inspectors were tasked with monitoring the freeze. To this end, the IAEA was present in Yongbyon continuously from 1994 to 2002. In addition, the IAEA continued to implement safety measures for other facilities at the Yongbyon site that were not subject to freezing, namely the IRT research reactor, the Critical Assembly, the Critical Assembly and the deforestation of nuclear fuel. The IAEA`s mandate to monitor the agreed framework judgment was based on the fact that it is not surprising that the U.S. approach to “maximum pressure” did not work.
A confidence-building process is needed between the two sides – under these conditions, North Korea`s “action-by-action” approach is a much more realistic basis for negotiations.